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RECENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel-In Massialt
v. United States,' the petitioner and a man named Colson were indicted
for violating the federal narcotics laws. Each retained counsel, pleaded
not guilty, and was released on bail. A few days later, without the petitioner's knowledge, Colson decided to cooperate with the Government
agents in their continuing investigation of the narcotics activities in
which the petitioner, Colson, and others allegedly had been engaged.
Colson permitted an agent to install a radio transmitter under the front
seat of Colson's automobile so that the agent, equipped with a receiving
device, would be able to hear any conversations carried on inside. Subsequently, Colson and the petitioner had a lengthy conversation while sitting in the car, in the course of which the petitioner made several incriminating statements. At the petitioner's trial, these incriminating
statements were brought before the jury through the agent's tesimony,
despite the petitioner's objection.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that it was error to allow the agent
to testify to the incriminating statements. This argument was based on
two separate and distinct grounds. First, he contended that the use of
the radio equipment violated his fourth amendment rights and, consequently, that all evidence thereby obtained was inadmissible under the
rule of Weeks v. United States.2 Second, he contended that his fifth and
sixth amendment rights were violated because the Government agents
had deliberately elicited the incriminating statements from him after his
indictment and in the absence of his counsel.
The Court decided in favor of the petitioner and based its reasoning
on his second argument, stating that the right to assistance of counsel
accrues, at the latest, when the suspect is indicted and that any statement
elicited from the accused after indictment and in the absence of his
counsel can not be used as evidence against him at his trial. In so disposing of the case, the Court never reached the fourth amendment issue.
Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that the
petitioner's sixth amendment right to counsel was denied even though
the incriminating statements were indirectly gained through the help of
his co-defendant, Colson. Such an indirect and surreptitious interrogation was said to be more of an infringement of an accused's rights than
an ordinary police interrogation, because the accused did not realize that
he was being questioned. The Court, however, took pains to point out
that it was permissible to continue an investigation of the petitioner's
alleged criminal activities, but that statements of a defendant so obtained
could not be introduced as evidence against him.
184 Sup. Ct. 1199 (1964).
2232 U.S.383 (1914).
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One month after the Court handed down the decision of Massiah v.
United States, it extended the Massiah rule in the case of Escobedo v.

Illinois.3 In Escobedo, the Court said that when the investigation is no

longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has focused on a
particular suspect, the right to assistance of counsel attaches. Therefore,
the sum effect of the Massiah and Escobedo decisions is that when a
person becomes the "accused," irrespective of whether or not he has
been formally charged, a right to assistance of counsel arises. This right,
once established, continues to exist unless it is competently and intelligently waived. 4
It should be noted that the Court did not consider any fourth amendment issues in reaching its decision in Massiah. Faced with a comparable
situation in On Lee v. United States,5 the Court, on the other hand,
based its decision on the fourth amendment while ignoring the sixth
amendment implications. That case involved facts similar to those in
Massiah,except that the incriminating evidence was obtained before the
indictment. In On Lee, an acquaintance equipped with a hidden radio
transmitter engaged the petitioner in a conversation while in the petitioner's store and later, while on a city street.The Court held that the
federal agent who heard the incriminating statements on his radio receiver could testify to the conversation. The incriminating statements in
M
lassiah were made post-indictment and on the street. The statements
in Escobedo were pre-indictment and in the police station. Those in On
Lee were pre-indictment and on the street. Using time and location as
salient parameters, it appears that On Lee would be decided differently
today in light of the later Court pronouncements.
Approximately a year before the Court dec ided the Massiah and
Escobedo cases, it handed down a decision in Lopez v. United States6
which seems to be in conflict with these cases. The Lopez case involved
the attempted bribery of an Internal Revenue agent. The evidence at the
trial showed that the agent, while investigating the petitioner's business,
was offered a sum of money as a bribe to keep the agent from reporting
an alleged tax evasion. The agent, equipped with a hidden wire recorder,
met with the petitioner several days later on the pretense of accepting
some more bribe money. During the course of their conversation, the
petitioner again offered the agent money. The Court, after rejecting the
petitioner's defense of entrapment, stated that the recording of the conversation did not violate the petitioner's rights under the fourth amendment. The Court reasoned that because the agent could testify about the
conversation, an electronic device used to obtain the most reliable evi3 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964).
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5343 U.S. 747 (1952).

6 373

U.S. 427 (1963).
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dence of that conversation would also be admitted. In reaching this decision, the Court never discussed the sixth amendment implications.
Considering the Lopez fact situation, it would appear that when the
agent returned to record the petitioner's statements, the investigation
was no longer a general inquiry and the petitioner was actually, although
not formally, the "accused," thus rendering the recording inadmissible
under the Massiah-Escobedo rule. Lopez was not mentioned in A.assiah
or Escobedo, although on its face, the reasoning behind the MassiahEscobedo rule impliedly overrules Lopez, unless the Court makes the
distinction between a statement which admits a past crime and a statement which is made during the commission of a crime. A possible reason
for such a distinction is that the Court would feel that a person might be
forced or tricked into admitting a past crime, whereas no coercion would
be involved in merely recording the statements made while the criminal
act is taking place.
Many questions are yet unanswered. Has an investigation "focused"
on the accused as soon as he is picked up for questioning? Must he be
advised of his right to counsel? Must counsel be appointed during interrogation if the accused is indigent? In time, the answers will be provided
by the Court on a case-by-case basis.
LARRY L. JESKE

Evidence: Admission of Third Party's Declaration Against Penal
Interest-The defendant was arrested and convicted of possessing
heroin in violation of California law. The lower court refused to permit a police officer called by the state to testify on cross-examination
that the defendant's companion had admitted to the officer that heroin
which the defendant was charged with possessing actually belonged to
her. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that the police officer should
have been allowed to answer the question, contending that the hearsay
rule does not preclude admission of a declaration against penal interest.
The state's argument was that the traditional rule only admits those
declarations which are against the pecuniary or proprietary interests of
the declarant. Further, the state contended that there was no showing
that the declarant was unavailable to testify as to the matters involved.
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Spriggs,1 held in favor
of the defendant and ordered a new trial.
The English Sussex Peerage case, 2 decided in 1844, constitutes the
first expression of the rule that a declaration of a third party against
his penal interest is not admissible. Wigmore calls this case a "backward
3
step and an arbitrary limit put upon the [hearsay] rule."
136

Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P. 2d 377 (1964).

2 11 Cl. & F. 109 (1844), where the declarations of a clergyman that he had per-

formed a marriage which would subject him to a prosecution were rejected.
§1476 (3d ed. 1940).

3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

